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THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
AND CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
OF CHILDREN: RAMIFICATIONS 
FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Susan H. Bitensky* 
INTRODUCTION 
W hat is the big deal with spanking? Mter all, many of us were spanked as children and we turned out okay. Some of us may 
also have administered spankings to our own 
children and we are certainly not ogres. For a long 
time, most Americans have been accustomed to 
viewing corporal punishment of children as a 
mundane, unexceptional part of child rearing-at 
least as long as the punishment does not deterio-
rate into child abuse as it is traditionally con-
ceived. I Indeed, corporal punishment is common 
in the United States: more than 90% of American 
parents have hit toddlers and most continue to hit 
*Susan H. Bitensky is a professor of law at Detroit College of 
Law at Michigan State University. She has presented and 
published numerous papers in the area of children's rights, 
and teaches Constitutional Law, Evidence, and 
Jurisprudence. A more extensive version of this article appears 
in Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New 
Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 
31 U. MICH.] L. REFORM 353 (1998). 
I See Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: 
Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of 
Children, 31 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 353,354-58 (1998). 
their children for many years. 2 Could something 
so commonplace be wrong? Is a smack or two on a 
toddler's bottom a human rights issue? 
I submit that, yes, it is a human rights issue and 
that the conventional wisdom is wrong. More 
modern conventional wisdom has begun to reflect 
this idea. Newsweek reported in the summer of 
1997 that the present generation of educated 
middle-class parents tends to view spanking as 
politically incorrect.3 In any event, this article will 
demonstrate that corporal punishment of children 
is a human rights issue of paramount importance 
and that it is properly treated as such by the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(Convention).4 Then this article will explore what 
ratification of the Convention would mean for the 
legal status of corporal punishment of children in 
the United States. 
2 See MURRAY A. STRAUSS, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 3 (1994). 
3 See Larry Reibstein & Susan Miller, The Debate over Discipline, 
NEWSWEEK SPECIAL ISSUE, Spring/Summer 1997, at 64 (compar-
ing the political correctness of spanking and smoking). 
4 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20,1989. 
G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/44/736 (1989) art. 37(a) [hereinafter Conven-
tion] . 
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CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 
Corporal punishment of children is a human 
rights issue for three reasons. First, subjecting 
children to violence against which adults are pro-
tected is patently unfair as unequal treatment. If 
your adult neighbor does something infuriating, 
you would not swat him to get him to change his 
behavior. Every state has assault and battery laws, 
manifesting society's repudiation of swatting as a 
behavior modification or dispute resolution tech-
nique between adults. That moral standard should 
not change simply because the person on the 
receiving end is a child. In light of children's 
vulnerability and dependency on their parents and 
teachers, subjecting children or pupils to violence 
and the dread of violence is perhaps even less 
defensible than subjecting anyone else to such 
practices. The arbitrariness of this difference in 
treatment is even more apparent when it is consid-
ered that corporal punishment is ineffective. Ac-
cording to most authorities, corporal punishment 
does nothing to further the main goal of disci-
pline: the child's development of internal control 
and conscience.5 If there is any deterrent effect on 
the child's conduct, it is of but fleeting duration. 6 
Second, corporal punishment of children is a 
human rights issue because such punishment 
causes harm to children, both during childhood 
and later in life. 7 By definition, corporal punish-
ment is intended to cause pain as a means of 
controlling, modifying, or punishing the child's 
conduct. As an invasion of their bodily integrity, 
children experience this pain and an accompany-
ing sense of degradation and humiliation. Such 
suffering is compounded by the fact that children 
are helpless to alleviate their situation. They can-
not retaliate; any anger they feel upon being struck 
must be repressed. This dynamic may cause ad-
verse psychological and physical symptoms in chil-
dren because their anger will surface in other ways. 
Thus, corporal punishment can cause children to 
exhibit aggressiveness, antisocial behavior, depres-
sion, withdrawal, anxiety, tension, and decreased 
5 See Bitensky, supra note 1, at 426 n.354 (citing PETER NEWELL, 
CHILDREN ARE PEOPLE Too: THE CAsE AGAINST PHYSICAL PUNISH-
MENT 19 (1989); NANCY SAMAI.JN, LOVING YOUR CHILD Is NOT 
ENOUGH: POSITIVE DISCIPUNE THAT WORKS 74 (1987». 
6 Bitensky, supra note 1, at 424 n.348. 
7 See id. at 425-35. 
empathy.S Corporal punishment may also induce 
physiological damage, including somatic responses 
such as headaches and stomachaches.9 Corporal 
punishment also can lead to more severe child 
abuse with attendant injuries.10 
However, some of the most ominous ramifica-
tions of corporal punishment are those that are 
manifested when children who have felt the rod 
reach adulthood. Analysis by respected psycholo-
gists reveals that corporal punishment of a child is 
all too likely to produce an adult with lasting 
psychic misery and maiming. 11 As psychologist 
Alice Miller has explained, 
What becomes of this forbidden and therefore 
unexpressed anger? Unfortunately, it does not 
disappear, but is transformed with time into a 
more or less conscious hatred directed against 
either the self or substitute persons, a hatred that 
will seek to discharge itself in various ways permis-
sible and suitable for an adult. 12 
Studies have drawn correlations, for instance, be-
tween corporal punishment and such adult disor-
ders as depression, obsessive-compulsive behavior, 
dissociation, paranoia, aggressiveness, authoritari-
anism, and lack of empathy.13 Some of these 
8 See id. at 424 nn.347, 427 nn.357-60 (citing PHIUP GREVEN, 
SPARE THE CHILD: THE REUGIOUS ROOTS OF PUNISHMENT AND 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 122-23, 129 
(1991); IRWIN A. HYMAN, READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY 
STICK: THE APPALUNG STROY OF PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ABUSE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 94, 99-100 (1990); Murray A. 
Straus et aI., Spanking by Parents and Subsequent Antisocial 
Behaviour of Children, 151 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLES-
CENTMED. 761, 762-64 (1997». 
9 See id. at 427 n.365 (citing IRWIN A. HYMAN, READING, WRIT-
ING, AND THE HICKORY STICK: THE APPALUNG STORY OF PHYSICAL 
At'\lD PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE IN AMERICAt'\l SCHOOLS 95, 100 
(1990» . 
10 See id. at 427 n.366 (citing PENELOPE LEACH, YOUR GROWING 
CHILD: FROM BABYHOOD THROUGH ADOLESCENCE 224 (1996); 
PETER NEWELL, CHILDREN ARE PEOPLE Too: THE CAsE AGAINST 
PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT 21-31 (1989». 
11 See id. at 428. 
12 ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GoOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN 
CHILD-REARING AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 61 (Hildegarde & 
Hunter Hannum trans., The Noonday Press 3d ed. 1990). 
13 See Bitensky, supra note 1, at 430-31 nn.377-83 (citing PHIUP 
GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD: THE REUGIOUS ROOTS OF PUNISH-
MENT AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 126-
41, 148-74, 198-204 (1991); MURRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE 
DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMI-
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syndromes have implications for society at large as 
well as for personal welfare. Authoritarianism, 
aggressiveness, and lack of empathy are the stuff 
from which tyranny and genocide are made. 
The third reason corporal punishment is a 
human rights issue is because an assumption under-
lying the punishment is that children are their 
parents' chattel. When parents spank children, 
they, wittingly or not, presume that they own 
children, otherwise they would not feel free to do 
to their children that which cannot be done to 
people who are not "owned." The notion that 
anyone can be another's property is repugnant to 
basic human rights norms. It is telling that as 
historically oppressed peoples have liberated them-
selves from being legally categorized as the prop-
erty of others, such liberation typically has engen-
dered legal protection from physical 
chastisement. 14 With the emancipation of Confed-
erate slaves, Caucasians could no longer legally 
beat Mrican-Americans; likewise, American women 
ultimately achieved reform such that husbands 
could no longer legally beat their wives. Perhaps if 
children were no longer regarded as parental 
chattel, they too would soon be spared the rod. 
Because corporal punishment of children is a 
human rights issue, it should not come as a 
surprise to find that it is prohibited by the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Corporal Punishment and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 
Although the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child does not mention corporal punishment or 
spanking, the Convention does clearly forbid all 
corporal punishment of children. The Committee 
on the Rights of the Child (Committee), the body 
that monitors compliance with the Convention 
and issues authoritative interpretations of its provi-
sions, has advanced the idea that the Convention 
as a whole is inconsistent with corporal punish-
ment of children. In an official report issued in 
1994, the Committee declared: 
LIES 67-146 (1994». 
14 See Bitensky, supra note 1 at 440 nn.426-27 (citing Stephen 
Nissenbaum, Lighting the Freedom Tree, N.Y. DMES, Dec. 25, 
1996, at AI7); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE 
FAMILY 129 (1989). 
Corporal Punishment of Children 
In the framework of its mandate, the Committee 
has paid particular attention to the child's right to 
physical integrity. In the same spirit, it has stressed 
that corporal punishment of children is incompat-
ible with the Convention and has often proposed 
the revision of existing legislation, as well as the 
development of awareness and educational cam-
paigns, to prevent child abuse and the physical 
punishment of children. I5 
The Committee has articulated and elaborated 
this idea many times in its concluding observations 
following examination of progress reports submit-
ted by various countries. 16 
Specific Provisions in the Convention 
With respect to specific provisions of the Conven-
tion, it is Article 19, paragraph 1 that most readily 
lends itself to interpretation as prohibiting corpo-
ral punishment of children. Article 19, paragraph 
1 provides, in part, "States parties shall take all 
appropriate ... measures to protect the child from 
all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or 
abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreat-
ment or exploitation ... while in the care of 
parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person 
who has the care of the child.,,17 That Article 19 
prohibits corporal punishment of children would 
seem evident as a semantic matter since the provi-
sion requires nations to protect children from "all 
forms of physical ... violence." 18 Article 19 would 
not refer to "all forms of physical ... violence" in 
addition to "injury or abuse" unless the former 
phraseology was meant to cover corporal punish-
ment as opposed to only traditional conceptions of 
child abuse. The interpretation that Article 19 
prohibits corporal punishment is not only schol-
arly surmise, but has been the position of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child as well. I9 
As further evidence of its belief that the Conven-
15 U.N. Doc. CRC/C/34, AnnexN, at 63 (1994) 
16 See Bitensky, supra note 1, at 392 n.193 (citing various 
concluding observations of the Committee on theRights of 
the Child). 
17 Convention, supra note 4, at art. 19(1). 
18 See Bitensky, supra note 1, at 394 n.195 (citing Jerry R. 
Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment in 
Public Schools: Jurisprudence that Is Literally Shocking to the Con-
science, 39 S.D. L. Rev. 276,278-79 (1994». 
19 See id. at 395 nn.198-200. 
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tion bans corporal punishment, the Committee 
has repeatedly relied on Articles 28 and 37 of the 
Convention as a basis for criticizing countries that 
have not repudiated corporal punishment of chil-
dren.20 Article 37, paragraph (a) provides, in part, 
that, "States Parties shall ensure that no child shall 
be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. ,,21 Marta San-
tos Pais, a former rapporteur of the Committee, 
explained that it is too narrow a reading of Article 
37 to identify torture only with "extremely serious 
and massive cases. ,,22 She noted that torture may 
cover a variety of situations, even those that cause 
"unperceivable mental suffering" or those involv-
ing "a disciplinary measure which may be degrad-
ing or inhuman. ,,23 
Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Convention pro-
vides that, "States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that school discipline is admin-
istered in a manner consistent with the child's 
human dignity and in conformity with the present 
Convention.,,24 The Committee on the Rights of 
the Child and the commentators have read Article 
28, paragraph 2 as requiring states parties to take 
measures proscribing corporal punishment in the 
schools.25 Such a reading ensures that school 
discipline is "in conformity with the ... Conven-
tion," because, as aforementioned, other parts of 
the Convention outlaw corporal punishment of 
children.26 Such a reading also is "consistent with 
the child's human dignity" because being physi-
cally attacked as a matter of right reduces the child 
to chattel, a subhuman status that is inherently 
demeaning. 
Article 28, paragraph 2 is not the only provision 
of the Convention protective of the child's dignity. 
For example, the Convention's preamble extols 
20 See id. at 202. 
21 Convention, supra note 4, at art. 37 (a). 
22 Marta Santos Pais, Address at the International Seminar on 
Worldwide Strategies and Progress Towards Ending All Physi-
cal Punishment of Children 10 (Aug. 22,1996) (transcript on 
file with the author). 
23Id. 
24 Convention, supra note 4, at art. 28(2). 
25 See e.g., Concluding Observations on the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child: Zimbabwe, U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 
12th Sess., ~18, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add. 55 (1996). 
26 See id. at 392-401 nn.193-210 & 219-30. 
"the inherent dignity ... of all members of the 
human family," the "dignity ... of the human 
person," and the need for children to be raised 
"in the spirh of ... dignity. ,>27 Article 39 directs 
that children who have been the victims of any 
form of cruel or degrading treatment shall recover 
"in an environment which fosters the ... dignity of 
the child. ,,28 Judith Karp, the current Vice-Chair 
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, has 
categorically stated, "[p] hysical punishment is a 
form of violation of the human dignity of the 
child.,,29 
In addition to finding further support for the 
ban on corporal punishment in the Convention's 
provisions on dignity, the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child has taken the position that at least 
three other provisions of the Convention may 
contain the ban. First, the Committee has found 
that the right to be free of corporal punishment is 
protected by the Convention's nondiscrimination 
principle in Article 2, paragraph 1.30 The reason-
ing is that the principle forbids justifying corporal 
punishment of children simply because they hold 
the status of children.31 Second, the Committee 
has advised that spanking is barred by the insis-
tence on the primacy of the best interests of the 
child in Convention Article 3, paragraph 1.32 
Third, the Committee has also discerned a prohibi-
tion on corporal punishment in the assurance of 
Article 12, paragraph 1, that the child should be 
allowed to participate in all matters affecting his or 
her life.33 Ms. Santos Pais elucidated that participa-
tion implies dialogue and peaceful conflict resolu-
tion, thereby excluding violent solutions to family 
differences.34 
Both semantics and authoritative interpretation 
make clear that the Convention forbids all corpo-
ral punishment of children. But, one must con-
27 Convention, supra note 4, at pmhl. 
28 Id. at art. 39. 
29 Judith Karp, Address at the International Seminar on End-
ing All Physical Punishment of Children in Europe 3 (Oct. 19, 
1997) (transcript on file with the author). 
30 See Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2 (1). 
31 See Pais, supra note 22. 
32 See Convention, supra note 4, at art. 3(1). 
33 See id. at art. 12(1). 
34 See Pais, supra note 22. 
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sider what this means for nations that become 
parties to the Convention, most pertinently, what 
the implications would be for the United States ifit 
were to ratify the Convention. In its concluding 
observations and elsewhere, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has urged states parties to 
engage in educational campaigns against corporal 
punishment of children.35 This stands to reason. If 
a country is going to forbid corporal punishment, 
its leaders had better educate the populace that 
this is their national policy. However, the Commit-
tee has urged an even more dramatic step. The 
Committee has urged nations to adopt legislation 
outlawing all corporal punishment of children.36 
Existing Laws That Prohibit Corporal Punishment 
Before dismissing this latter recommendation as 
unworkable or outlandish, one should realize that 
six nations have already enacted laws against all 
corporal punishment of children and one nation 
has achieved the same end by judicial decision. 
Sweden led the way with legislation adopted in 
1979.37 Finland, Norway, Austria, and Cyprus fol-
lowed with their own enactments during the 
1980s.38 Italy's Supreme Court of Cassation issued 
a ruling in 1996 ending corporal punishment of 
35 See, e.g., Concluding Observations on the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child: Guatemala, U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 
12th Sess., 'lI45 U.N. Doc. No. CRC/C/15/Add. 58 (1996); 
Concluding Observations on the Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
Honduras, U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 7th Sess., 'lI27 
U.N. Doc. No. CRC/C/15/ Add. 24 (1994); ConcludingObserva-
tions on the Committee on the Rights of the Child: France, U.N. 
Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 6th Sess., 'lI24 U.N. Doc. No. 
CRC/C/15/ Add. 20 (1994). 
36 See, e.g., Concluding Observations on the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child: Germany, U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 
10th Sess., 'lI30 U.N. Doc. No. CRC/C/15/Add. 43 (1995); 
Concluding Observations on the Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
Senega~ U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 10th Sess., 'lI24 
U.N. Doc. No. CRC/C/15/Add. 44 (1995); ConcludingObserva-
tions on the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Ukraine, U.N. 
Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 10th Sess., 'lI29 U.N. Doc. No. 
CRC/C/15/Add. 42 (1995); Concluding Observations on the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Belgium, U.N. Comm. on the 
Rts. of the Child, 9th Sess., 'l[l5 U.N. Doc. No. CRC/C/15/ 
Add. 38 (1995); Concluding Observations on the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child: Poland, U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 
8th Sess., 'lI30 U.N. Doc. No. CRC/C/15/ Add. 31 (1995). 
37 See 6 kap. 1§ fOriildrabalken (Swed.) [Swedish Children and 
Parents Code ch. 6, §1] (Swedish Ministry of Justice trans.). 
38 See Bitensky, supra note 1, at 368-70 nn.51-62, 380-82 nn.77-
111. 
Corporal Punishment of Children 
children in that country.39 And, Denmark, improv-
ing upon an earlier law discouraging corporal 
punishment of children, enacted an outright pro-
hibition in 1997.40 
The pattern of these laws is that they announce 
an explicit prohibition against caretakers using 
corporal punishment on children along with other 
language protective of the child's well-being.41 
Sweden's statute is fairly typical, providing that 
"[c]hildren are entitled to care, security and a 
good upbringing. They shall be treated with re-
spect for their person and their distinctive charac-
ter and may not be subject to corporal punishment 
or any other humiliating treatment. ,,42 
Cyprus' statute is alone in providing for penal-
ties on its face. 43 The anti-spanking statutes of the 
Scandinavian countries and Austria are silent about 
legal penalties for violations.44 In spite of this 
silence, in each of the enacting countries and in 
Italy, a statutory basis does exist upon which to 
prosecute offenders for assault and battery or 
related crimes. This does not mean, though, that 
parents in these countries are routinely prosecuted 
for spanking their children. Prosecution of parents 
for corporally punishing children is rare or nonex-
istent inasmuch as all of these countries have 
opted for prosecutorial restraint on this issue.45 In 
39 See id. at 380-82 nn.112-27 (citing Cambria, Cass., sez. VI, 18 
marzo 1996, [Supreme Court of Cassation, 6th Penal Section, 
March 18, 1996], Foro It. II 1996, 407 (Italy». 
40 See id. at 371 nn.66-67 (citing Lov Dr. 416 om aendring aflov 
om foraeldremyndighed og samvaer § 1 [Danish Act to Amend 
the Act on Parental Custody and Conviviality no. 416 § 1] 
(Kromann & Munter trans.». 
41 See id. at 362 n.20, 368 n.52, 371 n.66, 373 n.77, 375 n.88. 
42 See 6 kap. 1§ f6riildrabalken (Swed.) [Swedish Children and 
Parents Code ch. 6, §1] (Swedish Ministry of Justice trans.). 
43 See Bitensky, supra note 1, at 379 nn.109-11 (citing Act of 
June 17, 1994, Law 147(1), OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REpUBLIC 
OF CYPRUS No. 2886 (Leonidas Markides, Embassy of the 
Republic of Cyprus trans.) ). 
44 See id. at 362, 368, 371,373,375. 
45 See id. at 364-77 nn.32, 75-76, 89 & 100 (citing Interview with 
G6ran Hokansson, Permanent Undersecretary, Swedish Min-
istry of Health and Social Affairs, in Dublin, Ir. (Aug. 21, 
1996); Letter fromJorn Vestergaard, Assoc. Professor, Inst. of 
Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Copenhagen, to 
the author 1 (July 3, 1997) (on file with University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform); Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, 
Executive Public Prosecutor and Section Head of the Section 
on National Family Law, Austrian Ministry of Justice, in Vi-
enna, Aus. (June 24, 1996». 
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some countries, such as Sweden, Finland, Norway, 
and Austria, violation of the anti-spanking statutes 
may also adversely affect custody awards in divorce 
cases.46 
Nor is the prohibition of all corporal punish-
ment of children purely a foreign phenomenon. 
America's best kept secret is that Minnesota also 
prohibits all such punishment. Unlike its Euro-
pean counterparts, Minnesota does not have a 
single statute that explicitly forbids parental corpo-
ral punishment of children. Rather, the state's ban 
must be teased out of four statutory provisions 
read together.47 These statutes have removed the 
use of reasonable force, including corporal punish-
ment, as a defense to assault charges.48 That is, if 
parents use "reasonable force" on a child as a 
disciplinary tactic, they may be prosecuted by 
Minnesota for assault and may not hide behind the 
excuse that they were just using "reasonable" 
corporal punishment. As one expert has noted, 
"corporal punishment is considered a crime to the 
same extent as any assault" in Minnesota.49 
Although Minnesota has lived with this prohibi-
tion for many years, there are no reported cases of 
a parent being prosecuted for administering mild 
corporal punishment to children. As in the Euro-
pean countries that have banned corporal punish-
ment of children, it appears Minnesota exercises 
prosecutorial restraint in relation to this issue. 
Prosecutorial Restraint and the Efficacy of 
Anti-spanking Laws 
Although governments use prosecutorial re-
straint, anti-spanking laws are not meaningless and 
46 See id. at 365 n.34, 370 n.60, 375 n.86, 376 n.90 (citing 
Telephone Interview with G6ran Hokansson (July 19, 1996); 
Letter from Isabella Riska, Attorney, Roschier-Holmberg & 
Waselius, Helsinki, Finland, to the author 3 (July 26, 1996); 
Letter from Finn Erik Engzelius, of the law firm of Thommes-
sen Krefting Greve Lund, Oslo, Norway, to the author 1-2 (July 
24, 1996) (on file with UnivlffSity of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform». 
47 See id. at 386-87 n.155-59, 161-63 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
609.06, subd. 1 (6) (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
609.379 (West 1978 &Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.224, 
subd. 1(1) (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02, subd. 7 
(West 1987». 
48 Letter from Victor I. Vieth, Senior Attorney, National Cen-
ter for Prosecution of Child Abuse, to Nadine Block, Director, 
Center for Effective Discipline 1 (Oct. 29, 1997) (on file with 
the author.). 
49 See id. 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child shows 
much wisdom in promoting them. Aristotle said 
that the essence of law is not that it commands 
conduct but that it creates a habit of obedience to 
itself over time.50 In other words, law has a peda-
gogical role. Law has an educative effect because it 
crystallizes and makes visible in an impressive way, 
at the level of governmental authority, those norms 
that constitute a society's priorities and aspirations. 
Law tells us who we are and should be. 
Many European countries are accustomed to 
laws that are mere pronouncements without refer-
ence to penalties. In the Scandinavian countries 
and Austria, the anti-spanking laws fit this mold. 
Because these laws are so clear, they can and do 
play a pedagogical role that creates a habit of 
obedience to their legal mandate over time. More-
over, it is arguable that the educative effect of these 
laws is enhanced by the knowledge that although 
prosecution for corporal punishment is highly 
unlikely, such prosecutions or adverse custody 
decisions are still possible. For example, a few 
isolated prosecutions of parents for spanking their 
children have occurred in Sweden.51 
Minnesota's laws have less potential to carry out 
a pedagogical role because they do not explicitly 
state a ban on all corporal punishment of children. 
Rather, these laws, through obtuse and intricate 
statutory construction, achieve a ban by removing 
reasonable force as a defense to assault. The result 
is that the notice function of these Minnesota laws 
has been virtually lost on laypersons and even on 
the non-prosecutors in the legal community. 
An Anti-Spanking Statute for the United States 
Despite the educational and, therefore, deter-
rent effect of the anti-spanking laws adopted in 
Scandinavia and Austria, my own preference, espe-
cially for the United States, is the Cypriot model 
which makes clear on its face both that corporal 
punishment is forbidden and that offenders may 
be subject to prosecution.52 This model is prefer-
50 See Bitensky, supra note 1,441 n.435 (citing Aristotle, Nicoma-
chean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARiSTOTLE 927,952 (W.D. 
Ross trans. Richard McKeon ed., 1941). 
51 See id. at 366 n.35 (citing PETER NEWELL, CHILDREN ARE 
PEOPLE Too: THE CASE AGAINST PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT 81 
(1989) ). 
52 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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able because the United States has a legal system 
that does not make laws merely to announce 
preferred policies without creating adjunctive en-
forceable rights, duties, or liabilities. I also prefer 
this model for our country because it seems 
Americans are highly resistant to the idea of 
restraining adults from spanking. Combining 
clearly articulated prohibitory language with the 
penalty language in one statute may be preferable 
in the United States because it is in a format that is 
both familiar and unequivocal and, therefore, 
more accessible to the average citizen. 
Naturally, an offender could be prosecuted un-
der such a statute. The existence of criminal 
liability does not mean, though, that the main 
purpose of the statute would be to haul parents 
into court. As in Minnesota and the European 
countries that have banned corporal punishment 
of children, prosecutorial restraint would be the 
most advisable policy. Nothing is lost by such 
restraint. The existence of the law and threat of 
prosecution should serve the law's pedagogical 
goals. A conservative prosecutorial strategy would 
take cognizance of the fact that the new statute 
proscribes adult behavior that may be impulsive 
and difficult to control. Such a policy would also 
probably make the statute more politically accept-
able and prevent the courts from being clogged 
with armies of parents facing criminal charges. 
One possible version of a statute that would carry 
out the intended purposes might read as follows: 
(1) (a) Corporal punishment is defined as the 
use of physical force with the intention 
of causing a child to experience bodily 
pain so as to correct, control, or punish 
the child's behavior. 
(b) Any person who uses corporal punish-
ment on a child shall be guilty of the 
crime of battery provided that such 
physical force would be a battery if used 
on an adult. 
(2) The penalties for conviction pursuant to 
subsection (1) shall be the same as those for 
conviction under any other criminal battery 
provisions or, in lieu thereof in appropriate 
cases, shall be a post-trial or post-plea diver-
sion program. 
(3) Nothing stated in subsections (1) or (2) 
herein shall preclude or limit further prosecu-
tion under any other applicable laws for the 
use of corporal punishment described in 
subsection (1). 
Corporal Punishment of Children 
(4) The proscription set forth in subsection (1) 
shall not apply to the use of such physical 
force as is reasonably necessary to prevent 
death or imminent bodily pain or injury to 
the child or others. 53 
A few explanatory remarks about this draft 
statute are in order. First, the proscription in 
subsection (1) employs both the shorthand term 
"corporal punishment" and a definition of the 
elements of corporal punishment in order to put 
everyone on notice and leave no doubt that it is 
indeed spanking that has been outlawed. Second, 
subsection (1) includes intent as an element of the 
crime not only because intent is an element of 
battery, but also in order to distinguish prosecut-
able conduct from acts that may cause pain for 
other purposes such as putting antiseptic on a cut 
or restraining a child from running into traffic. As 
an extra safeguard for adults, the proposed statute 
only proscribes physical force that would be a 
battery if used on an adult. Third, subsection (1) 
requires that prosecutable use of force must be 
"for the purpose of correcting, controlling, or 
punishing the child's behavior" in order unmistak-
ably to remove correction, control, and punish-
ment as defenses to criminal liability. 
Note that subsection (2) makes the penalties for 
hitting a child the same as for hitting an adult, 
thereby communicating that children are not chat-
tel worthy of less protection. Subsection (2) also 
offers diversion as an alternative to traditional 
criminal penalties in jurisdictions where such pro-
grams are available. This option is offered in 
recognition of the fact that it would probably be 
more productive for offenders to be counseled 
about better parenting skills than to be fined or 
incarcerated. Subsection (3) is designed to ensure 
that the statute will not be used to preclude 
prosecutions for more serious child abuse if they 
would be appropriate. And, finally, subsection (4) 
recognizes that physical force may be used in 
emergencies to restrain the child from injuring 
herself or others. 
In sum, the U.N Convention on the Rights of the 
Child prohibits corporal punishment of children. 
The Commitee on the Rights of the Child has 
53 This statute was first set forth in Bitensky, supra note 1, at 
443. 
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urged states parties to campaign against corporal 
punishment and to enact legislation to achieve 
prohibition. In fact, Minnesota and some Euro-
pean countries have already enacted such legisla-
tion. This article proposes a statute that might 
more effectively achieve prohibition in the United 
States. The crucial question is whether widespread 
enactment of such a new statute would fit into the 
American legal scheme. 
The Feasibility of an Anti-spanking Statute 
"Reasonable" corporal punishment of children 
by their parents or guardians is currently legal in 
every state except Minnesota.54 Approximately 
half of the states permit school personnel to use 
"reasonable" corporal punishment on students as 
well.55 Thus, law reform on this issue in the United 
States would require enactment of new statutes 
prohibiting all corporal punishment of children 
and repeal of existing state statutes permitting 
such punishment. Should such an undertaking 
seem overwhelming, it is worth recalling that 
similar law reform was needed and implemented 
t~ bar husbands from physically chastising their 
WIves. 
Finally, it may be objected that what is practically 
feasible is not necessarily constitutionally permis-
sible. The U.S. Constitution is supreme such that 
no other laws may contravene its provisions and 
survive judicial challenge. 56 Laws forbidding corpo-
ral punishment would, therefore, need to be consis-
tent with federal constitutional doctrine. 
The Constitution is silent on corporal punish-
ment of children. The United States Supreme 
Court has never characterized such punishment as 
a constitutionally-protected activity.57 Indeed, the 
Court has addressed the subject of corporal punish-
ment of children only with respect to its constitu-
tional permissibility in the schools. In 1977, in 
Ingraham v. Wright,58 the Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment does not apply to the pad-
dling of children as a means of maintaining disci-
54 See id. at 356 n.5. 
55 See id. at 355 n.4. 
56 U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2. 
57 See Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1387, 1389-92 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
58 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
pline in public schools.59 The result is that while 
elementary and secondary schools are not forbid-
den by the Eighth Amendment from corporally 
punishing students, states are still permitted to ban 
the practice from educational facilities. 
However, some will no doubt argue that prohibi-
tion of corporal punishment of children by par-
ents or other adults in the family circle raises 
constitutional concerns arising out of parental or 
familial prerogatives. It may be anticipated that 
these naysayers will raise four arguments: first, that 
prohibition arguably would violate parents' substan-
tive due process right to rear their children as the 
parents see fit; second, the prohibition could be 
viewed as violating parents' free speech right to 
communicate with their children; third, the prohi-
bition could be interpreted to constrict parents' 
right of free exercise of religion insofar as physical 
chastisement is religiously based; and fourth, the 
prohibition may be regarded as infringing familial 
privacy rights. 
There are separate counterarguments to each of 
these contentions. For example, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that violence against 
another person cannot be a part of anyone's free 
speech rights.60 The reach of the Free Exercise 
Clause typically protects religious beliefs rather 
than religiously motivated conduct burdened by 
laws of general applicability.61 And, privacy rights 
may be more personal than they are familial. 62 But, 
there is no need to explore separate counterargu-
ments because each of the four previously men-
tioned constitutional arguments suffer from the 
same defect. That is, like wife beating or other 
physical assaults, corporal punishment is so egre-
gious in its effects and so ethically unpalatable that 
in a civilized society it must be outside the defini-
tional parameters of any constitutional right-be it 
child-rearing, religious or other expression, or 
59 See id. at 664. 
60 See Bitensky, supra note 1, at 464 n.539 (citing Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) and NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918-18 (1982». 
61 See id. at 460 n.519 (citing Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/ 
Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurispru-
dence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious 
Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. LJ. 713, 722, 731, 750-52, 771 (1993». 
62 See id. at 463 nn.531-37 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 453 (1972) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-
55(1973». 
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family privacy. It follows that if corporal punish-
ment is not part of any constitutional right, legisla-
tures may prohibit it without showing a compelling 
interest or any other justification beyond what 
rational legislative discretion and wisdom dictate. 
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that 
the Supreme Court has not held that under the 
Constitution familial or parent-child relations must 
be free of all governmental regulation. The Court 
has acknowledged "that the state has a wide range 
of power for limiting parental freedom and author-
ity in things affecting the child's welfare,,63 and 
that "the family itself is not beyond regulation in 
the public interest.,,64 
In fact, states routinely legislate so as to further 
child welfare by directing parents to engage in or 
to desist from engaging in various kinds of con-
duct. There are state laws requiring parents to have 
their children vaccinated65 and to provide their 
children with state-approved education66 as well as 
laws prohibiting parental child abuse.67 There are 
also laws governing when children may drive, 
d . k 68 rm ,vote, contract, or marry. 
The Supreme Court has approved of the state's 
inherent parens patriae power to intervene in the 
family and restrict parental conduct so as to 
protect children's well-being in Prince v. Massachu-
setts.69 In Prince, the custodial aunt of a nine-year-
old permitted the child to accompany her on the 
streets where they attempted to distribute Jeho-
vah's Witnesses' publications.70 The aunt was 
charged with violating a Massachusetts child labor 
law that forbade such conduct. 71 She asserted, 
among other things, that the state law abridged 
her and her niece's right to free exercise of 
63 Princev. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944)). 
64 Id. at 166. 
65 See DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 24.08 
(2d ed. 1994)). 
66 See id. at § 24.04. 
67 See id. at §§ 16.02-16.22. 
68 See id. Bitensky, supra note 1, at 467 n.551 (citing Francis 
Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning 
of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REv. 975,1012, n.143 (1988)). 
69 321 U.S. 158,166 (1944). 
70 See id. at 161-62. 
71 See id. at 160-61, 164. 
Corporal Punishment of Children 
religion.72 She also claimed that the state law 
unconstitutionally interfered with the parental 
child-rearing right under the Due Process Clause.73 
The Court found that street preaching was danger-
ous to the child. Not only would it create the same 
sorts of difficult situations that adult propagandiz-
ing may produce, but it could cause "emotional 
excitement and psychological or physical injury" 
to the child.74 As such, the child's street preaching 
was not and could not be part of the aunt's First 
Amendment right to practice religion freely or of 
the aunt's substantive due process child-rearing 
right. 
Thus, Prince exemplifies the Court's willingness 
to put to one side plaintiffs' characterizations of 
the constitutional status of parental directives and 
to assess for itself whether those directives are 
given by constitutional right. The Court has not 
shied from repudiating that constitutional status 
where parental conduct would be likely to impair a 
child's psychological or physical well-being. Enact-
ment of a prohibition against all corporal punish-
ment of children would constitute governmental 
interference with parental conduct to precisely 
this end of protecting the child's well-being. The 
prohibition has even more justification than the 
street peddling statute in issue in Prince because 
corporal punishment of children may have lasting 
adverse effects for the persons punished as well as 
grave societal ramifications. 
CONCLUSION 
The key to understanding the human condition 
may be in looking at behaviors that are so much a 
part of daily life for so many, that no one steps back 
to question them. One such key behavior is corpo-
ral punishment of children-a behavior that may 
help to account for what is cruel and vengeful in 
the human heart. The U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child has given us the immense 
advantage of clearly putting corporal punishment 
into its proper perspective as a serious human 
rights issue and of mandating abolition of such 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 164 
74 Id. at 169-70. 
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punishment. If the United States were to ratify the 
Convention, the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child would probably recommend that we take 
educational and legal measures to achieve aboli-
tion. The American legal system presents no signifi-
cant obstacles to such measures. Indeed, abolition 
by legislative fiat would comport with some of our 
most enlightened legal history. 
234 Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty 
